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TO:	Name or Title	Orgen. Symbol	Room No.	Bldg.	Initials	Date
1.	Mr. Rogers		WDR			2/12
2.	Mr. Ryan		WAR			
3.	Mr. Luers		WXX			
4.						
5.						

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For Correction	Necessary Action	Signature

REMARKS OR ADDITIONAL ROUTING

Don Fraser has high praise for WDR's Boston human rights speech, which he inserts into the Record. Don also notes recent improvements in our Chile policy.

FROM: (Name and Org. Symbol)	ROOM NO. & BLDG.	PHONE NO.
G. Lister		

tain and perpetuate our Nation's precious heritage of freedom and democracy.

I congratulate the Sokol membership in the 11th District, which I am privileged to represent, the city of Chicago, and all across the Nation on their enormous contributions to America's past and I extend my warmest best wishes to them as they continue their diligent efforts to keep our Nation strong and free.

SECRETARY ROGERS CALLS HUMAN RIGHTS AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT IN UNITED STATES-LATIN AMERICAN RELATIONS

HON. DONALD M. FRASER

OF MINNESOTA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, February 11, 1976

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Speaker, William D. Rogers, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, recently addressed the Pan American Society of Boston on "Human Rights and Foreign Policy in Latin America." The speech presents a well-reasoned analysis for the increasing importance which human rights should play in the conduct of U.S. foreign policy. The speech is responsive to the concerns that many Members of Congress have expressed regarding the need for U.S. foreign policy to be responsive to the human rights dimension of international relations.

We have begun to see some small steps toward this end: the State Department's decision not to request military assistance for Chile in fiscal year 1976; the favorable vote of the U.S. delegation to the U.N. General Assembly on the resolution concerning human rights in Chile; and the U.S. protest at Chile's decision to refuse entry to the U.N. field mission. Hopefully, these actions are but the beginnings of a new foreign policy founded upon the principle that human rights is an essential element in our Nation's foreign policy. Secretary Rogers speech lays a solid foundation for such a policy.

The document follows:

HUMAN RIGHTS AND FOREIGN POLICY IN LATIN AMERICA

(Address by the Honorable William D. Rogers, Assistant Secretary of State For Inter-American Affairs)

It will come as no surprise to many of you that the issue of human rights has become, in very recent times, a major interest and a vexing dilemma for our relations with the other nations of this Hemisphere. Of course, there is a wide range to our Latin American policy—Cuba, Panama, interdependency politics, nationalization problems and so forth. But when I came to reflect, I found I could not resist the temptation to concentrate on the human rights issue, here in Boston, now on the eve of our own independence celebrations.

The issue is high on the agenda of public concern. The evidence of public interest about human rights practices in the Hemisphere is close at hand. I cite a few examples: your own senior Senator's amendment to last year's Foreign Assistance Act banning military assistance to Chile; the considerable editorial and news attention to the report on Chile by the UN Human Rights Working Group; and the House-passed

amendment to this year's foreign assistance legislation which would hinge our bilateral economic aid throughout the world to human rights policies in the recipient countries.

These efforts are not academic or frivolous. The rights of man are real issues in today's world. Individual guarantees are not everywhere insured. Our Hemisphere is hardly a refuge of democracy. Freedom of expression is not everywhere seen as contributing to public order; politically related arrest, torture and summary execution do exist in the Americas. We can hardly ignore the irony that this should be so in a Hemisphere which treasures a common origin in struggle against foreign tyranny.

At the beginning of the last decade, when I came to government for the first time, the coincidence, indeed the interrelationship, in Latin America of political oppression and economic underdevelopment seemed self-evident and was our abiding concern. We assumed that these twin conditions, if unassuaged, would lead in many states to radical revolution. We also assumed that our efforts toward economic progress would be bootless without political liberalization.

The point remains that fifteen years ago, in the early Sixties, the subjective reality in Washington was a fear for the future of an unreformed Latin America. It was from this fear that the Alliance for Progress sprung.

We hoped then to hold violent revolution at bay temporarily while reform eroded the revolutionary constituency. We thought that in the longer run force could succeed only in league with justice. It now appears that we exaggerated both the importance of reform for stability, and our ability to induce reform and democracy.

The economies of the Hemisphere have made considerable progress since 1960. The struggle toward democracy, however, if one can sum the experience of the Hemisphere, has not been as successful.

This is not to say, of course, that Latin America now, almost fifteen years after the Alliance began, is unrelievedly authoritarian. There are a fair number of countries which are authentic struggling democracies, where speech remains free, where political dissent is welcome and where the use of arbitrary arrest and police brutality as political instruments are unknown. Costa Rica, Colombia, Venezuela, Trinidad and Tobago deserve our special respect in just this sense, to name several.

Otherwise, the nations of the Hemisphere span a fairly wide spectrum of human rights practices, political participation, pluralism and conditions of societal openness.

But all are friends, and important to our interests. While often critical of the behavior of multinational corporations, they provide a large and growing market for our capital and our goods. As a group within the Third World Bloc, they are a force for moderation and compromise. In other words, by the standards of diplomacy, we want good relations. We have interests everywhere, in some countries more acutely than in others, which we are bound to protect and cultivate. And it is precisely this fact, juxtaposed against their internal behavior, which can sometimes and in some countries create dilemmas of conscience and policy for the United States.

Some foreign policy analysts take a traditional view. They suggest that the United States should be unconcerned about the way another regime treats its own citizens. Only where the human rights of U.S. citizens are threatened, the argument goes, is there a basis for our engagement. Otherwise we should measure the virtues of other governments by the degrees to which they promote our other political, economic and military interests.

In my judgment, this prescription for the conduct of U.S. diplomacy lacks only pru-

dence, humanity and realism. It is inhumane because, as Secretary Kissinger has noted, "Many of our decisions are not imposed on us by (the requirements of national) survival". There are cases where we clearly have the latitude to "seize the moral opportunity", as he has put it. Moreover, although "our power will not always bring preferred solutions . . . we are still strong enough to influence events, often decisively". A nation that fails to exercise such influence where it can do so without paying an excessive price in terms of its other interests betrays humanity and itself.

And that is why, as applied to the United States, the prescription of disinterest is imprudent and unrealistic, as well as inhumane. For it demands that we reject our heritage and therefore our identity. The American people have, from the beginning of the nation's history, embraced a sense of mission. There have been times when that sense has been twisted into a parochial arrogance and deployed to justify the exercise of national power for either crassly selfish or dazzlingly paternalistic ends. We have not been immune to the imperial virus. But after each deviation from the conception of the U.S. as vanguard in an unrelenting struggle to enlarge the frontiers of human freedom and justice, we have purged ourselves with self-criticism and reaffirmed the original vision. In this country, the cynics and the Realpoliticians have not enjoyed permanent employment.

One reason we have regularly rejected their counsel is the often intuitive appreciation that a remarkably diverse people such as we are have a peculiar need for overarching ideals. Those ideals, by accommodating our ethnic, racial, and religious diversity, have cemented our unity, given focus to our priorities, and thus made us a powerful force for decency in the world. Our bedrock principles—representative government, the individual right to liberty of conscience and to equal opportunity for participation in the good things of organized society, including wealth, power, education and respect—not only bind us together into a single people but, in addition, link the American people with their Government. In this country, no Government can conduct foreign policy if it is lacking broad public support. There will be no broad public support for a policy which is indifferent to the claims of humanity beyond our frontiers.

We have come to realize, in short, that the human rights practices of other nations are not matters of their internal concern exclusively. Human rights are relevant to the conduct of our relationships with the other nations of the Hemisphere.

But, while I perceive a broad and growing consensus within the American electorate that the Government address the issue of human rights in the Americas, the precise weight human rights should receive in the conduct of our diplomacy is an issue not without dilemmas.

A prime source of difficulty is the older notion that there is a sharp distinction between human rights, on the one hand, and our traditional political, strategic, and economic interests on the other; that they are generally unrelated; and indeed that they are often opposed. The point, to some, is that by concerning ourselves with human rights practices we may do damage to other relations with a particular country. The dichotomy is far too facile.

Oppressive regimes often seem more permanent than they are. Opposition sentiment, being forced underground, is concealed. Forces for change and moderation may be biding their time. Complaints which in a representative system would work their way up to decision centers for resolution, fester. To most observers, the authoritarian Government of Portugal looked solid enough until the very eve of its utter collapse. So

did the corrupt and brutal order imposed on Greece by Papadopolis and company.

There is not, therefore, a simple dichotomy between moral and other values in the conduct of our relations with particular nations. There is, as well, the question of the degree to which our interest in the long term should be subordinated to what may be a short-term consideration.

Another defect in the conception of human rights as a value distinct from other diplomatic concerns is its failure to take account of the universality of American interests and of the increasingly transnational character of politics. A number of political movements have branches throughout Europe and in many Latin American states. If we are to lead a coalition of democratic people, we must act consistently and coherently across the board to support the values we mutually profess.

I do not, of course, propose that human rights and all other interests of state are always complementary. Such a claim would simply replace the illusion of a perpetual dichotomy with another of universal harmony. In the real world, there are tough choices to be faced.

There are, in the first place, national interests at stake which can compete with our concern with human rights. And even if one focuses solely on the human values and attempts to operate on the theoretical assumption that the concern of our diplomacy is the enhancement of those values, the choices are wide. A too narrow conception of human rights will not serve.

There is a tendency to focus exclusively on a present delinquency, and ignore the human rights consequences of efforts to terminate the delinquency or, at a minimum, to dissociate ourselves from the delinquent.

Détente is a clear case in point. We do not conceal our concern for the abuse of human rights in the Soviet Union, or for that matter, in Cuba. We do not pretend to a coincidence of values with either nation.

Yet we probe for areas of accommodation with both. In the case of the Soviet Union, we do so in order to reduce the risk of war and, if possible, the terrible costs of armament which consumes so large a portion of our economic means, means which might otherwise be employed to place a higher floor under poverty both at home and abroad. These are just as much moral and human ends as the efforts to protect Soviet dissidents.

Here, then, is another reason why when we attempt the translation of humanitarian concern into concrete policy, it is necessary to avoid too simple a distinction between human rights and the traditional ends of diplomacy. In specific cases, the apparent dichotomy may in fact, be convertible either into a conflict over alternative conceptions of ends and means for promoting human rights or, as I noted earlier, into a debate over short-run versus long-run strategic interests.

How then to structure the human rights inquiry in a way which will recognize these complexities? What, in other words, are the standards against which national behavior in the human rights field is to be judged? And how is the process of judgment to occur?

There is a yardstick of public inhumanity. Every country is represented somewhere on it. No national record is unblemished.

But there are differences of degree, even after one makes a proper allowance for varying historical experiences and levels of economic, social and political evolution.

And there are, in the end, qualitative thresholds. These are the limits below which no government can fall without international judgment. Mass murder, officially tolerated torture, mass imprisonment or exile of those who peacefully dissent, comprehensive denial to some racial, religious or ethnic

group of the opportunity to participate in the various social values, these acts are beyond the pale. They transgress the minimal standards of decency declared by mankind at large in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, as well as a plethora of UN Resolutions, regional covenants and virtually all national constitutions. These international governing norms are so unequivocal and so profoundly embedded in the contemporary conscience that even those governments that perpetrate these acts feel compelled to deny them and conceal their delinquencies.

We have, I think, a clearer view of the purpose and role of America in the world today than we have had in times past. We now know better that our own national standard is not necessarily the moral standard of the world; or at least we cannot force it to be. We know that our political habits, our untidy process of public policy decision-making, our openness, and our tolerance are not for many others, at least not yet. And we know, therefore, that if we are to help enhance respect for human rights, the standards of judgment must be standards which derive their authority, not from our experience and tradition, but from international consensus. We are not the moral preceptors of the world, and we should not pretend to that role.

This is the significance of the Universal Declaration and of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man which, as Thomas Burgenenthal has said in his recent article in the *American Journal of International Law*, has now a greatly strengthened normative character as a result of the most recent amendments of the Charter of the Organization of American States. These, and a constellation of international organization resolutions along similar lines, set down collective standards against which the behavior of signatory nations may properly be judged. Their authority is international and universal, not national and paternalistic.

By the same token, the process of measuring the observance of these international principals must also, in the first instance, be international. This is the reason why it is essential that we lend our assistance to strengthening the authority and the self-confidence of the international instruments of human rights observance—the UN Human Rights Commission and, in our Hemisphere, the Inter-American Human Rights Commission.

The experience with both organizations is limited. Both are in their infancy. Neither enjoys the wholehearted support of its constituency. There are dangers for both. The member states may cripple them out of fear that they will prove dangerous. They may attempt to manipulate their agenda in a hypocritical fashion to avoid equal treatment and force the commissions to concentrate on a few unpopular targets. Or they may attempt to dilute the efforts of the two by packing them with ineffective or timid people.

The United States has a major role to play. If, as I have suggested, a concern with human values is an essential element in our contemporary foreign policy, and if the establishment of human rights standards should in the first instance be those set down by international compact and measured by international machinery, then it is our obligation to insure that that international machinery rapidly achieves a measure of competence, respect and permanence which will insure that its efforts are taken seriously and its writ runs wide. To this end, we must insure that the Commissions are blessed with effective and courageous members, that they are adequately staffed, that their budgets allow for the full range

of essential activities and that finally their efforts are encouraged and supported in the member states.

The question whether international machinery can bear effectively on human rights issues is particularly acute in this Hemisphere. The nations of the Americas share many things. But the most significant common bond is not geography or history but morality. Here, if anywhere, the nations of this part of the world are bound by a common dedication to the rights of man.

So, in a sense, the capacity of the inter-American system to sever, protect and enhance those rights is very much at stake just now. That system has traditionally concentrated on relations between nations. The record of the Organization of American States on issues of peace and political security is well-known; now, it is increasingly seized with vexing questions of our economic relationships—and, I might add, has been not very much more immune than its sister organization in New York to the rhetorical temptations of that issue.

The human rights issue, however, is of a new sort for the OAS. It represents a challenge to the inter-American system unlike the challenges of the past. For it tests whether the nations of the Hemisphere share enough common moral ground to cooperate, not merely in addressing relations between states, but as well in the application of international standards of how nations should treat their own citizens.

It is early yet to say whether the inter-American system can discharge this important task. The Inter-American Human Rights Commission, as I have said, is in its infancy.

But its efforts are of a piece with the humane tradition which has inspired the political development of the nations of the New World for two centuries. If there is any task more appropriate for the Organization of American States, I am unaware of it.

Its success—the extent to which the Commission can indeed nurture, protect and enhance respect for human rights in the Hemisphere—could come to be considered the most significant accomplishment of the inter-American system in the years to come.

The United States pledges its full support to that effort.

PENSION ABSURDITIES

HON. EDWARD MEZVINSKY

OF IOWA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, February 11, 1976

Mr. MEZVINSKY. Mr. Speaker, anyone directly involved with the Federal Government is aware of bureaucratic absurdities, wasteful duplication and regulatory inconsistencies.

One of the most distressing of those regulations is the provision that any increase in social security benefits triggers an equal decrease in the pensions for World War I veterans and widows. This means that the benefits are actually decreased in a period of rampant inflation. Those hurt by this provision are those least able to afford it: senior citizens and those on fixed incomes.

This provision violates our sense of propriety, the needs of those veterans and widows, and the intent of Congress in providing additional cost-of-living benefits for those in need.

I have introduced legislation, H.R. 5732, which would correct this situation.